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REDHIBITION: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE ADOPTION OF A PROFESSIONAL
SELLER STANDARD FOR AUTOMOBILE DEALERS
Since the purchase of an automobile typically represents the in-
vestment of a significant portion of a person's budget, it is under-
standable that discontented buyers often resort to an action in redhibi-
tion to rescind the sale or reduce the price of their purchase. The
buyer can choose three possible defendants: the dealer, the distributor,
or the manufacturer. The right to recover damages depends upon the
defendant's actual or imputed knowledge of the vice and his failure
to disclose it, in other words, whether the court finds the defendant
to be a good faith or bad faith seller. In order to give greater protec-
tion to the consumer, Louisiana courts should apply, or the legislature
should adopt, a professional seller standard for automobile dealers.
This standard would require one who makes his living at selling pro-
ducts to know the quality of his wares, and knowledge of vices in
the wares would be imputed to the dealer, even in the absence of
actual knowledge. The need for adoption of this standard is better
understood by viewing the typical marketing scheme for automobiles1
and the liability that the law presently attaches to its participants
in an action in redhibition.
Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some
unremedied vice or defect in the thing sold that renders it either ab-
solutely useless or its use so inconvenient that it must be supposed
that the buyer would not have purchased it if he had known of the
defect.' To maintain an action in redhibition, the buyer first must prove
that the vice existed at the time of the sale Second, the buyer must
show that the defect was not known or discoverable upon a reasonable
inspection.' Third, it is necessary to show the redhibitory nature of
the thing, i.e., that the thing is either absolutely useless for its in-
tended purpose or that its use is so inconvenient that it must be sup-
posed that the buyer would not have purchased it had he known of
the defect.' Finally, if the seller was ignorant of the defect, the buyer
must prove that the seller could not or would not correct the defect
when given a reasonable opportunity to do so. If, however, the seller
knew of the defect or was otherwise in bad faith or if the buyer is
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. This note will deal specifically with actions in redhibition for sales of
automobiles and motor homes, two of the most common purchases for which this remedy
has been chosen.
2. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520.
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2530; Associates Fin. Servs. Co. v. Ryan, 382 So. 2d 215
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
4. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2521-2522.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531; Jordan v. LeBlanc & Broussard Ford, Inc., 332 So.
2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
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suing the manufacturer, the buyer is not required to give the defen-
dant an opportunity to repair.7 In such a case, the seller is liable not
only for the return of the purchase price and the expenses of the
sale, as is every good faith seller, but also for any other damages
that the buyer incurred and for reasonable attorney's fees, as a result
of the seller's violation of Louisiana Civil Code article 1901's stan-
dard of good faith performance.! The buyer must bring the action of
redhibition within one year from the date of the sale9 unless the seller
was in bad faith or was a manufacturer, in which case the buyer must
sue within one year from the date of discovery of the defect." Because
liability beyond restoration of the price depends upon the seller's
knowledge of the redhibitory condition, the liability of the manufac-
turer, to whom such knowledge is imputed, is the greatest. The
manufacturer is always deemed a bad faith seller fully responsible
for the return of the purchase price, the expenses of the sale, the
damages that the buyer incurred, and reasonable attorney's fees.11
Distributors'2 and dealers may be equally responsible if knowledgeable
of the defect, but because such knowledge is not imputed to them,
their responsibility usually is somewhat less.
Source of the Liability of a Manufacturer
Roman and French law envisioned a situation in which buyers and
sellers were presumed to enter into bargaining personally and to
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531. The Civil Code affords the good faith seller an
opportunity to repair; however, no such opportunity is given to the bad faith seller.
Moran v. Willard E. Robertson Corp., 372 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979). Any
seller who knew of the defect and failed to declare it or any seller to whom knowledge
of the defect is imputed is a bad faith seller. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2545; Doyle v. Fuerst
& Kraemer, Ltd., 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911).
8. Associates Fin. Servs. Co. v. Ryan, 382 So. 2d 215, 220 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
See also Note, Sales-Implied Warranty-Liability of Producer, 13 LA. L. REv. 624
(1953).
9. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2534.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2546. The prescriptive period runs from the date of the
last attempt to repair, when the dealer has tried to do so. White v. Martin GMC Trucks,
Inc., 359 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ granted in part with remand, 362 So.
2d 1116 (La. 1978), original opinion reinstated on remand, 365 So. 2d 1135 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1978), writ denied, 367 So. 2d 391 (La. 1979); Williams v. Lucien J. Caruso,
Inc., 374 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (repair of house); Brown v. Dauzat, 157
So. 2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) (repair of house).
11. Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, Ltd., 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911); George v.
Shreveport Cotton Oil Co., 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432 (1905).
12. Because of the distributor's position as middleman, he is treated sometimes
as a dealer and sometimes as a manufacturer. The Automobile Dealers Day in Court
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1221-1233 (1976), demonstrates the nature of the classification of the
distributor in its definitions.
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possess approximately equal bargaining power."8 This idea was based
on the presumption both that the seller was the manufacturer of the
thing sold and that the nature of the thing sold was relatively un-
complicated as compared to the machinery sold today. This theory,
as reflected in the works of several scholars, was the basis of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer,
Ltd.," which established the presumption that a manufacturer knows
the defects in the products which he produces. In Doyle, the supreme
court cited Pothier's proposition that a workman is responsible for
damages from defects in the things he produces under the theories
of spondet peritiam artis (he gives the solemn pledge of proficiency
in his art) and imperitia culpae annumeratur (incompetency is reckoned
a fault). 5 The court Also cited Dalloz for the principle that good faith
does not exclude incompetency. Doyle is the basis in Louisiana for
the imputation to a manufacturer of knowledge of the vices in his
product.
An interesting aspect in establishing the liability of a manufac-
turer arises from the language of the Civil Code articles on
redhibition. 7 The Code uses the word manufacturer only in article
2531, which gives the seller of the defective thing a right of action
against its manufacturer. In all of the other redhibition articles, only
the word seller is used. This choice of language gives rise to the issue
of how the manufacturer's liability for defects is established. In one
case, Borne v. Mike Persia Chevrolet Co.," the defendant manufacturer
argued that a "manufacturer" was not a "seller" within the meaning
of the Civil Code articles on redhibition because the word "seller"
contemplated the buyer's immediate vendor. The court, however, re-
jected this argument, stating that such a finding would ignore the
fact that a manufacturer sells to dealers and through them to con-
sumers by using national advertising campaigns and good reputation.
Once a manufacturer is called a seller for purposes of redhibition,
there still remains the problem of how a buyer can sue his seller's
seller. The landmark redhibition case of Media Production Consultants,
Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc." abolished privity of con-
13. F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE S 427 in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 555
(1977).
14. 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911) (citing the following commentators: Kent, Dalloz,
Troplong, and Pothier).
15. 1 R. POTHIER, TREATISES ON CONTRACTS-CONTRACT OF SALE No. 214 (L.
Cushings trans. 1839).
16. 129 La. at 843, 56 So. at 908 (citing Dalloz, CODE ANNOTES, art. 1645, nos.
15 & 16).
17. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2520-2548.
18. 396 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
19. 262 La. 79, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
1983] 1103
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
tract as a requirement in the buyer's suit against either the distributor
or the manufacturer.' Justice Barham, in a later law review article,
offered three possible explanations for this consumer right." First,
he suggested that the warranty against redhibitory vices was a stipula-
tion pour autrui made in favor of the ultimate consumer, but he dis-
counted this explanation for two reasons. He found that there was
no authority in the Civil Code, as there was in the Code Napoleon,
for the proposition that a man was presumed to have stipulated for
himself, his heirs, and assigns unless the contrary was expressed. In
fact, Justice Barham stated that there was a strong judicially created
presumption that unless a contract contained an express stipulation
for the benefit of a third party, there was no stipulation pour autrui.
Furthermore, Barham said that such stipulations seldom appeared in
sales contracts and, therefore, that this theory was untenable in Loui-
siana because the requirement for express stipulation was ignored
when applied to this particular situation.22 Justice Barham's second
theory for the lack of a privity requirement was a transmission theory.
The buyer's right to sue for breach of warranty against redhibitory
vices was transmitted with the object of the sale as an accessory of
that object.23 The third theory suggested was subrogation. Courts had
used Civil Code article 2503, from the section on eviction, to extend
the right of subrogation to the area of redhibition. 24 Thus a subvendee
was subrogated to all the rights of his immediate vendor to sue for
breach of the warranty against redhibitory vices. The problem with
this extension arose in the area of prescription. If the second ven-
dor's right of action in warranty had prescribed against his vendor,
20. The rule set forth in Media abolishing the requirement of privity gives the
Louisiana consumer a distinct procedural advantage over consumers in some common
law states. The Uniform Commercial Code imputes in every sale by a merchant a
warranty from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer that the goods sold are
merchantable and, in certain circumstances, that the goods are fit for the purpose
for which they are purchased. U.C.C. § 2-314 & 2-315 (1978). Although SS 2-318 of the
U.C.C. does not require privity in cases where personal injury damages are sued for,
there is a split of authority as to whether privity is required where the damages
are purely economic. For example, in New York, lack of privity is a bar to an action
under the implied warranty of merchantability where damages are purely economic.
Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 442 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 1981);
Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
Thus, in New York, it would be necessary to find an express warranty from the manufac-
turer to the particular plaintiff in order to maintain an action against the manufac-
turer. However, some states have extended the implied warranty to remote purchasers
without privity. Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
21. Barham, Redhibition: A Comparative Comment, 49 TUL. L. REV. 376 (1975).
22. Id. at 380.
23. Id. at 381.
24. Id. at 383.
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the subvendee's right by subrogation had also prescribed.25 Barham
suggested that rather than extending Civil Code article 2503, it would
have been better to analogize the warranty against eviction to the
warranty against redhibitory vices, but even with that analogy, he
found that the same prescription problems arose. He thus concluded
that the transmission theory was the most practical." It must be
remembered, however, that the Media court did not identify or espouse
any particular theory as the basis of the consumer's right to sue the
manufacturer without privity; the court simply said that it was follow-
ing "the consumer protection rule" in abolishing the privity require-
mentY To summarize, Louisiana courts have based the manufacturer's
imputation of knowledge of the vices in his wares on the once ac-
curate thesis that the seller and manufacturer are one and the same
person. This imputed knowledge, under article 2531, always results
in the manufacturer being a bad faith seller, who is afforded no op-
portunity to repair and who must pay attorney's fees and damages
in addition to the expenses of the sale and the restitution of the pur-
chase price. Under Civil Code article 1901, the seller is entitled to
the buyer's good faith performance (payment of the price). By imputing
knowledge of the vice, the courts are punishing a manufacturer by
depriving him of the buyer's performance and not allowing him a
chance to repair the vice. This severe sanction may be justified by
saying that since the manufacturer is the artisan, he should know of
the vices of his wares if anyone should and, further, that the fear
of liability for the return of the retail price, not the wholesale price,
plus other damages will encourage him to produce fit products. Loui-
siana courts thus far have held that the benefits of such a punitive
system outweigh the consequences.
Liability of Distributors
The distributor's liability can never be more than that of the
manufacturer because the manufacturer is responsible for the full
scope of liability in a redhibition action. There are three situations
delineating the distributor's scope of liability. First, the distributor
who knows of the vices in an automobile and sells it without declar-
ing them is deemed a bad faith seller subject to full liability.28 Second,
if the distributor is in good faith, he is liable only for the purchase
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 262 La. at 90, 262 So. 2d at 381.
28. Full liability is liability for the return of the purchase price, the expenses
of the sale, the damages incurred by the buyer, and reasonable attorney's fees. LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 2531 & 2545.
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price and the expenses of the sale." Third, the courts sometimes place
the distributor in the "position of the manufacturer"' and therefore
saddle him with imputed knowledge of the defects and its accompany-
ing full liability, as in the case of any bad faith seller. The courts
will effect this imputation of knowledge when a distributor has
assumed total responsibility for domestic marketing, inspecting, and
presale preparing of vehicles manufactured by a corporation chartered
outside the United States. This was the court's approach in Media,
in which the seller was insolvent and the manufacturer was foreign
chartered. The court's finding that the distributor was in the position
of a manufacturer gave the buyer a domestic deep-pocket, which was
fortunate, for his seller, a then defunct corporation, was judgment-
proof.
A series of defective automobile cases following Media found the
distributors to be in the manufacturer's position where the manufac-
turers were such foreign corporations as Fiat, Volvo, Volkswagen, and
Toyota.2 In all these cases, the foreign chartering of the manufac-
turer, which precluded recovery by the consumer without his in-
stituting suit in the country of incorporation, played a part in deter-
mining the liability of the distributor. It is questionable whether the
amenability to suit of either a manufacturer or dealer should affect
the extent of liability of a distributor when the Civil Code bases the
extent of liability on the good or bad faith of the defendant, that is,
whether the defendant was guilty of wrongdoing or not.
Liability of Dealers
In Louisiana, there is no apparent presumption of knowledge of
defects against the dealer who is not a manufacturer, nor is there
a duty incumbent on him to inspect. If the defect is obvious, the seller
is not expected to do anything, because an apparent defect is not
redhibitory 3 If the defect is nonapparent and the seller does not find
it, he is selling in good faith. While it may appear that there is no
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2531.
30. Media, 262 La. at 90, 262 So. 2d at 380.
31. Media, 262 La. at 89-90, 262 So. 2d at 380.
32. Hoychick v. Gulf States Toyota, Inc., 386 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980);
Huffman-Euro Motors, Inc. v. Physical Therapy Servs., Ltd., 373 So. 2d 565 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1979); Moran v. Willard E. Robertson Corp., 372 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1979); Perrin v. Read Imports, Inc., 359 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). See also
Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (the distributor of a
foreign made gun was treated as a manufacter); Comment, Automobile Sales in Loui-
siana: Redhibition or Retribution?, 20 Loy. L. REV. 313, 319 (1974) (the writer expresses
the opinion that the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to sue the distributor
because of the manufacturer's foreign chartering).
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2521.
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presumption of knowledge, ever since Ross v. John's Bargain Stores
Corp.,34 the courts have found that the seller has constructive
knowledge of the vice if it is discoverable in the exercise of ordinary
care. For example, the court allowed recovery of attorney's fees in
one case by finding that the seller should have known of the leak
in a windshield it had installed but failed to test.35 Therefore, the court
held the seller responsible as if it had known of the vice and were
a bad faith seller. This practice of imputing constructive knowledge
imposes a duty to inspect with ordinary care. Thus the present law
is unclear as to whether a seller owes a duty to inspect to the con-
sumer, a point which is determinative of the extent of the dealer's
liability in an action in redhibition. It is at this point in the scheme
of marketing automobiles that a professional seller standard is need-
ed. The professional seller standard employed today in France36 im-
putes knowledge of vices to one whose business it is to sell that pro-
duct and who thus should know his wares.37 The professional seller
of automobiles would be one who exercised "a profession touching
commerce in automobiles" or a "professional manufacturer or in-
termediary in automobiles."3 The first advantage of imposing this pro-
fessional seller standard would be to make the law in Louisiana clearer
and more consistent. Presently, there is no apparent duty incumbent
on a seller to inspect the car he sells for redhibitory vices, yet two
situations seem to impose such a duty. First, the courts in some cases
have found the seller to have constructive knowledge of a defect, say-
ing, in effect, that he should have known of it. 9 The professional seller
standard would impose a uniform duty to inspect on all professional
sellers, whether manufacturers, distributors, or dealers, not leaving
the seller in uncertainty as to his obligation to inspect. The other
situation that highlights the inconsistency of the present law is the
automobile seller who is sued in tort for damages resulting from
defects in a car. To hold the dealer liable, the court must find that
he had a duty, which he breached, to inspect for defects. If a dealer
owes a duty to inspect for tort purposes, requiring the same inspec-
34. 464 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1972) (a nonauto case, but source of the theory of con-
structive knowledge of the seller).
35. Wade v. McInnis-Peterson Chevrolet, 307 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
36. C. civ. art. 1646 n.7.
37. Imposition of this standard was suggested in Litvinoff, The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1978-74 Term-Sales, 35 LA. L. REV. 310 (1975) and in
Justice Barham's concurrence in denial of writ in Peltier v. Seabird Indus., 309 So.
2d 343 (La. 1975).
38. Judgment of 19 fevrier 1924, Paris, Gaz. Pal. 1924.1.650 (translation by this author).
39. Evangeline Medical & X-Ray Distribs. v. Coleman Oldsmobile, Inc., 402 So.
2d 208 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Wade v. McInnis-Peterson Chevrolet, 307 So. 2d 798
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Ross v. John's Bargain Stores Corp., 464 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1972).
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tion for contract purposes is not a burdensome obligation. Further-
more, the new standard would equalize the protection of tort plain-
tiffs and contract plaintiffs in requiring inspections in anticipation of
both kinds of claims.
Another advantage in imputing knowledge of vices to a profes-
sional seller would be to give more protection to the consumer by
making the prescriptive period applicable to all professional sellers
that of Civil Code article 2546, one year from the date of discovery
of the vice, rather than one year from the date of the sale, as is applic-
able to good faith sellers under Civil Code article 2534. The consumer
also would be entitled to attorney's fees and damages incurred, in
addition to a return of the purchase price and the expenses of the
sale under Civil Code articles 2531 and 2545. The state thus would
be encouraging dealers to inspect and know their wares, which might
prevent some injuries and losses. This standard also would be applied
to distributors who earned their living by selling cars, and thus all
links in the marketing chain would be required to ascertain the quality
of their products or be liable for the vices in them. While the costs
of inspection to professional sellers might be high, the additional ex-
pense would be justified at least partially by the fact that profes-
sional sellers hold themselves out as experts and the public relies to
a great extent on their claims.
One disadvantage of imposing this standard would be that the
price of the products probably would rise as the sellers passed their
costs on to consumers. Also, one commentator has opposed establishing
this standard on the ground that the legislature clearly indicated in
Civil Code article 2545 that a vendor was in bad faith only when he
knew of the vice and failed to declare it."° He argues that the bad
faith required is the kind of fraudulent conduct defined in Civil Code
article 1934(1) and that imputed knowledge is not the fraudulent
behavior that the legislature envisioned as being the only basis for
liability for attorney's fees and damages. Thus far no Louisiana court
has adopted the professional seller standard.
If the professional seller standard were imposed, the law would
be more certain in that imputation of constructive knowledge on a
case-by-case basis no longer would be necessary. The present prac-
tice of the courts is to decide in each case whether the dealer should
have known of the vice. With the imputation of knowledge of the
defects to all professional sellers, courts no longer would be faced
with the question; they would hold that all professional sellers should
have known. Imposition of the professional seller standard would allow
40. Campbell, The Remedy of Redhibition: A Cause Gone Wrong, 22 LA. B.J. 27
(1974).
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greater consumer protection without unsettling the law in other areas
related to redhibitory actions. For example, dealer fault, not simply
dealer bad faith, still would be required to free the manufacturer from
liability.41 Nor would there be a change in determining indemnity or
contribution among participants in the chain of distribution. Indemnity
and contribution between manufacturers and dealers held liable in
solido under Media still would not be determined on the good or bad
faith of the seller, but rather on the seller's fault in causing the
redhibitory vice. This conclusion is based on the court's construction
of Civil Code article 2531 in Evangeline Medical & X-Ray Distributors
v. Coleman Oldsmobile, Inc.42 There the trial court found that Coleman,
the dealer, had constructive knowledge of the defects and was,
therefore, in bad faith. The manufacturer of the motor home involved
argued that the seller's right to indemnification from the manufac-
turer under Civil Code article 2531 was granted only to the seller
in good faith mentioned in paragraph one of the article. The court
held that paragraph two was not limited to the seller in good faith
and, therefore, that Coleman was entitled to indemnification from the
manufacturer." Unless the supreme court is later presented with this
question and decides to the contrary, no effect will flow from the pro-
fessional seller standard in the area of indemnity.
Conclusion
The advantages of instituting a professional seller standard in
Louisiana outweigh the disadvantages. Such a standard would give
more protection to consumers through longer prescriptive periods in
which to bring actions in redhibition and by allowing the recovery
of damages and attorney's fees. There would be no upheaval in the
present law since the only significant effect of imposing constructive
knowledge on sellers would be that courts no longer would decide
on a case-by-case basis whether the seller knew of the vice. The stan-
dard also would satisfy the dictates of fairness; since the seller often
claims to be a professional, his liability should be commensurate with
his claims. The possible increase in the cost of automobiles would be
justified by the greater degree of care dealers would exhibit in ascer-
taining the quality of their merchandise; likewise, there would be an
41. Bell v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 357 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
42. 402 So. 2d 208 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
43. A good argument can be made that the right to indemnity granted in Civil
Code article 2531 is granted only to good faith sellers. First, the right is granted in
an article which addresses only the liability of good faith sellers. The rights and liabilities
of bad faith sellers are addressed in another article. Second, courts refuse to hear
the pleas of plaintiffs who come to court with unclean hands, and one who knew a
product had a vice and sold it without declaring the vice would not have clean hands.
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attendant decrease in the number of products sold containing vices.
In essence, the professional seller standard would be directly aligned
with "the consumer protection rule" adopted in Media and would sup-
port the strong public policy Louisiana has in regulating the sale of
automobiles."
Jeanne Frances Harvey
44. LA. R.S. 32:1251 (Supp. 1963) reflects this public policy:
The legislature finds and declares that the distribution and sale of motor vehicles
in the State of Louisiana vitally affects the general economy of the state and
the public interest and the public welfare, and that in order to promote the public
interest and the public welfare, and in the exercise of its police power, it is
necessary to regulate and to license motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors,
and dealers doing business in Louisiana, in order to prevent frauds, impositions,
and other abuses upon its citizens, and avoid undue control of the independent
motor vehicle dealer by the motor vehicle manufacturing and distributive organiza-
tions and foster and keep alive vigorous and healthy competition by prohibiting
unfair practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented,
and to protect the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and
practices detrimental to the public welfare, to prevent the practice of requiring
the buying of special features, appliances and equipment not desired or requested
by the purchaser, to prevent false and misleading advertising, to prevent unfair
practices by motor vehicle dealers, manufacturers and distributing organizations,
to promote the public safety and prevent disruption of the system of distribution
of motor vehicles to the public and prevent deterioration of facilities for servic-
ing motor vehicles and keeping same safe and properly functioning, and prevent
bankrupting of motor vehicle dealers, who might otherwise be caused to fail because
of such unfair practices and competition, thereby resulting in unemployment, disrup-
tion of leases, and nonpayment of taxes and loans, and contribute to an inevitable
train of undesirable consequences, including economic depression.
See also Baughman v. Quality Mobile Homes, 289 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
